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How should we understand Shearman & Sterling's recent ouster of its general
counsel, John Shutkin?1 Was the firm unhappy with Shutkin's performance? Did
he clash with top partners? Or was Shutkin a casualty of a change in the firm's
management philosophy, along with other lawyers who were "restructured" out
of their executive positions?
2
Certainly there was a change in Shearman & Sterling's management philoso-
phy. Shutkin was hired in 2004 to fill the firm's newly-established position of
law firm general counsel 3-seemingly part of a trend toward large law firms'
treatment of the position as a dedicated, professional position.4 Indeed, in 2004,
Shearman & Sterling was leading this trend, by hiring an experienced general
counsel from outside of the firm rather than relying on increasing service from
a practicing partner.5 Shearman & Sterling also took care to promote the
professional independence of the position, by hiring Shutkin as an employee
rather than a partner of the firm.6 According to then-senior partner, David
Heleniak, "we thought it made sense to have an independent and fresh look at
things, and we wanted to have somebody who was not otherwise engaged in
ihe firm's business to do it."'7 But Heleniak left for Morgan Stanley less than a
* Professor, New York Law School. Many thanks to Anthony Kearns, Frank Munger, Leslie Levin, Mitt
Regan, Rob Rosen, Tanina Rostain, and the editors of the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics for helpful
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1. Julia Berris & Klan Ganz, Shearman Ditches Global GC in Rejig, THE LAWYER, Apr. 28, 2008,
http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id= 132389&d=415&h=417&f=416 (reporting that Shearman &
Sterling had eliminated Shutkin's position as part of a management reorganization).
2. See Jeremy Hodges, Shearman to Shake Up Top-Level Management Structure, LEGAL WK., Apr. 18, 2008,
http://www.legalweek.com/Articles/l 1 17266/Shearman+ in +top-level+ management+ shake-up.htm] (report-
ing that Shearman & Sterling also reduced its executive committee from six members to three).
3. Mary Mullally, Analysis: The Adviser to the Advisers, LEGAL WK., May 8, 2004, http://www.legalweek.com/
Articles/Article.aspx?liArticlelD= 120987 (reporting Shutkin's appointment).
4. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1515,
1517-20 (2006) (discussing law firms' increasing reliance on full-time in-house counsel and the organization of
law firm in-house counsel into distinct professional networks).
5. See Lisa Lerer, A Safe Pioneer, AM. LAw., Oct. 1, 2004, at 32 (reporting Shutkin's appointment). Shutkin
previously was general counsel at KPMG International. Id.
6. Mullally, supra note 3.
7. Lerer, supra note 5, at 32 (quoting Heleniak).
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year after Shutkin's appointment,8 and his successor, Rohan Weerasinghe, has
instituted a series of organizational and management changes at the firm. 9 Now,
three years later, Shutkin is out, and Shearman & Sterling has eliminated the
position of law firm general counsel altogether.'o
Many large law firm partners would argue that Shutkin was doomed from the
start; that the basis of managerial authority in large law firms is "credibility as a
practitioner."'" The conventional wisdom is that "lawyers want to be managed by
a lawyer," 1 2 meaning someone actively engaged in private practice or not too
long removed. This view suggests that dedicated managers rarely will be
effective within law firms--especially those who are appointed from outside of
the firm. Most law firm general counsel are practicing partners with longstanding
ties to their firms.13
The academic literature on large law firms also emphasizes the limited
authority of professional managers and the ability of rainmaking partners to
sidestep formal management controls.' 4 Research suggests that bureaucratic'
management structures, such as dedicated, professional managers, tend to be
weak or unstable in law firms, where compensation and status are tied to control
over clients.' 5 As Robert L. Nelson argued in his classic, 1988 study, "a position
of managerial authority in the firm, whether it be membership on the governing
committee, a position at the head of a department, or managing partner, will
always be subordinate to the power of the lawyers controlling the largest bloc of
clients." 16 Thus, while many commentators point to the potential competitive
8. Susan Beck, Shearman Eliminates General Counsel Post, AM LAW DAiLY, May 2, 2008, http://
amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2008/05/shearman-elimat.html.
9. Bloomberg, Shearman Chief Bets on Asia Clients, Litigation to Lift Profit, Feb. 14, 2006, http:I/
www.xak.com/main/newsshow.asp?id= 56651 (discussing Weerasinghe's strategy for increasing firm profits).
10. Beck, supra note 8.
11. Nathan Koppel, Big Law Firms Try New Idea: The True CEO, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2007, at B3 (quoting
Evan Chesler, presiding partner of Cravath, Swaine & Moore).
12. Tom Schoenberg, Getting Down to Business, LEGAL TIAEs, Oct. 19, 1998, at S56 (quoting Michael
Nannes, then-deputy managing partner of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky).
13. Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1525-31 (describing the characteristics of in-house counsel in a sample of 47
law firms). See also Leslie A. Gordon, Law Firm GCs Continue to Multiply, GC CAL. MAG., Mar. 10, 2006,
http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id= 1141898562122 (stating that "law firm GCs tend to come
from the senior partner ranks" and "continue to work as active partners").
14. See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS wrrH POwER: THE SOCiAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FiRM
224-28 (1988) (discussing "client control as a constraint on managerial authority"); Elizabeth Chambliss,
Organizational Determinants of Law Firm Integration, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 715 n. 174 (1997) (discussing the
ability of powerful partners to sidestep formal assignment systems ["poaching"]); Douglas N. Frenkel, Robert
L. Nelson & Austin Sarat, Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 697, 704 (1998) (reporting the '"irrelevance of formal mechanisms to lawyers' daily discretionary
judgments"); Marc C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation,
67 FoRDHAM L. REV. 837, 858 (1998) (reporting that "formal ... controls on ethicality... are remarkably
weak").
15. See NELSON, supra note 14, at 224-28 (case studies of four Chicago law firms).
16. Id. at 224.
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benefits of professional management 17 -- or, what typically is referred to as the
"corporate"" model-most analysts are skeptical that U.S. law firms will em-
brace such a model any time soon.1 9
This Article stakes out a contrary view. I argue that dedicated executive
management is inevitable in large law firms and, with it, the development of
distinct cadres of professional lawyer-managers, such as law firm general counsel
and chief executive officers (or chairs). In fact, this process is well underway.
20
The more interesting question is the likely relationship between dedicated exec-
utive managers and other constituents of the firm, particularly equity partners.
Nelson and others have argued that truly autonomous management is unlikely in
law firms due to partners' ideology and/or economic power.21 I argue, however,
that the current conditions of competition among large law firms-that is, the
AmLaw 200 22-create new incentives for strong central management and new
sources of managerial authority within firms. Thus, I predict that partners
increasingly will embrace autonomous management.
My arguments grow out of my research on the position of law firm general
counsel.23 As I explain below, the structural evolution of the law firm general
17. See Deborah K. Holmes, Learning from Corporate America: Addressing Dysfunction in the Large Law
Firm, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 373, 403-06 (1996) (discussing the shortcomings of the partnership model and the
benefits of professional management); Frederick L. Trilling, The Strategic Application of Business Methods to
the Practice of Law, 38 WAsHBuRN L.J. 13, 14 (1998) (noting the "enormous potential for competitive
advantages" by firms that adopt basic business techniques, such as full-time, strategic management); David A.
Bradlow & Murray Silverman, Managing the Law Firm-Is Democracy Obsolete?, LEGAL ECON., July-Aug.
1989, at 28, 29 (arguing that "the traditional partnership form of organization is incompatible with the
successful formulation and implementation of strategy"); Carl A. Leonard, The Coming ofAge of the Managing
Partner as a CEO, MANAGING PARTNER, Mar. 1 2000 (discussing the advantages of strong centralized
management).
18. See Holmes, supra note 17, at 406 (urging the adoption of a "corporate structure" with professional
managers); Matthew S. Winings, The Power of Law Firm Partnership: Why Dominant Rainmakers Will Impede
the Immediate, Widespread Implementation of an Autocratic Management Structure, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 165,
176 (2006) (contrasting a "partnership model ... based on consensus" with a "corporate model" with strong
centralized leadership); Bradlow & Silverman, supra note 17, at 30 (defining the corporate model as the
centralization of management authority in the hands of a single individual such as "a president, [C]EO or
executive director").
19. See Winings, supra note 18, at 185-93 (discussing obstacles to the implementation of the corporate
model); James R. Faulconbridge & Daniel Muzio, Reinserting the Professional Into the Study of Globalizing
Professional Service Firms: The Case of Law, 7 GLOBAL NErwORKs 249, 250-54 (2007) (questioning the
emergence of a managerial archetype in transnational law firms); Jonathan E. Smaby, Kicking the Habit of a
Reactive Approach, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16, 2004, at S3 (discussing lawyers' resistance to centralized manage-
ment and strategic planning).
20. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1517-21 (discussing the professionalization of law firm in-house
counsel); LAW FIRMs YELLow BOOK (Summer 2008) (listing "who's who in the management of the leading U.S.
law firms").
21. See infra Part Il.
22. The AmLaw 200 are the 200 top-grossing U.S. law firms, as measured by the American Lawyer. See
John O'Connor, A Guide to Our Methodology, Am. LAW., Aug. 2005, at 89.
23. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General Counsel,
and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARiz. L. REv. 559 (2002) (exploratory study of the
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counsel position provides a valuable window into the dynamics of law firm
management, particularly changes in the bases of managerial authority. My
research also suggests a number of specific mechanisms for change, such as
industry consolidation, the development of professional networks among manag-
ers, and generational change among partners.
My analysis draws specifically on four sources of data: a study of the
emergence of in-house counsel in a non-random sample of 32 law firms, based on
focus groups and interviews conducted in 2001 and 2002;24 a follow-up study of
the original sample plus an additional 15 firms, based on interviews and
fieldwork conducted in 2005;25 and 12 interviews with law firm general counsel
and executive managers conducted in 2008.26 Altogether, the three waves of
interviews cover 55 firms. Respondents are identified by the year of the interview
and a unique number (e.g. 2001_1).27 I also draw on a national, non-random
survey of 76 law firm in-house counsel conducted in 2008.28. The survey was
sponsored by the American Bar Association Section of Business Law Firm
Counsel Project and the Association of Corporate Cotinsel (ACC), and was
administered by open invitation from the Firm Counsel Project.
29
Part II describes the "professionalization"3 ° of law firm general counsel-that
is, their increasing specialization and organization into professional networks-
emergence of ethics and risk management specialists in 32 law firms); Chambliss, supra note 4 (follow-up study
emphasizing the increasing specialization and professional organization of law firm in-house counsel).
24. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 561-62 (describing the study). The initial sample was a
"snowball" sample, in that we asked a few bar leaders and ethics specialists known to us to recommend
participants for the study, then asked these participants for more names, and so on, until we felt we had enough
data to present interesting preliminary findings. Id. at 561-62. See Charles Kadushin, Power Influence and
Social Circles: A New Methodology for Studying Opinion Makers, 33 AM. Soc. REV. 685, 694-96 (1968)
(discussing the strengths and weaknesses of snowball sampling). Most of the data come from three focus groups
held at Harvard Law School in 2001. Participants included bar regulators, academics, and outside lawyers who
specialize in professional liability matters, as well as law firm in-house counsel and their functional equivalents
in 29 law firms. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 561 n. 15 (describing the focus groups). The initial
sample also includes three respondents who did not participate in the focus groups, but whom I interviewed
individually by telephone. See id. at 561 n. 16.
25. The follow-up study was based on telephone interviews with 12 law firm in-house counsel and
participant observation at meetings and conferences where panels of firm counsel discussed their roles. I also
gathered some information via email. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1526 (describing the follow-up study).
26. The most recent interviews were conducted by telephone between April and September, 2008, and
included four firm counsel whom I had interviewed in prior years.
27. This represents a slight change from previous publications. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at
561 n. 15-16; Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1525-26 n. 55-56, 59-60 (explaining the system for identifying
respondents). Citations are provided for previously published remarks.
28. Elizabeth Chambliss, 2008 ABA ACC Survey Report (hereinafter "2008 ABA ACC Survey") (on file
with author).
29. See Firm Counsel Project, http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CL290005 (providing a
link to the survey) (now closed).
30. Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1517 (defining professionalization as "the process by which an occupational
group becomes increasingly specialized, organized, and autonomous, developing distinct knowledge claims,
titles, associations, and career tracks" [citations omitted]).
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and ends with the questions that Shutkin's story presents. To what extent can
professional firm counsel maintain credibility with equity partners? To what
extent will we see the emergence of external labor markets for firm counsel?
What does the evolying role of firm counsel imply for other top management
positions, such as chair?
Part III examines the conventional wisdom concerning the limited authority of
professional managers and argues, basically, that times have changed. Much of
the academic literature about the basis of managerial authority in large law firms
is grounded in market and regulatory conditions circa 1980, such as relative firm
stability, passive liability insurers, and the absence of competing organizational
forms. 31 Likewise, much of the ideological resistance to dedicated, professional
management comes from a generation of partners who are about to retire.32
Conditions have changed, with profound effects on the structure, if not yet the
culture, of law firm management. And cultural change, I argue, is imminent.
Part IV considers the normative implications of dedicated executive manage-
ment, particularly the implications for legal ethics and law firm self-regulation.
Some scholars have argued that the professionalization of risk management in
large law firms will induce moral apathy among lawyers and lead them to shirk
their ethical duties.33 U.S. regulators have raised similar objections to proposals
for law firm discipline, arguing that entity regulation will undermine individual
accountability. 34 Such concerns raise interesting empirical questions about the
relationship between organizational and individual regulation, and the sources
and strength of firm culture in large, multi-office firms.35 To date, however, there
is no evidence of structural determinism in this context. All law firms, whatever
31. See NELSON, supra note 14, at 34 (stating that the fieldwork for his analysis was conducted between 1979
to 1981); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry
into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313, 314-15 (1985) (quaintly
discussing "signs of serious institutional instability," such as "stories of individual partners leaving one firm to
join another.., and internal squabbles over the division of profits").
32. See Marc Galanter, Old and in the Way: The Coming Demographic Transformation of the Legal
Profession and Its Implications for the Provision of Legal Services, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 1081, 1097 (noting that
"large-firm practice has become a young person's game" and reporting an inverse relationship between firm size
and the presence of older partners).
33. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94 GEo. L.J. 1909,
1939-40 (2006) (arguing that firms' increasing investment in professional risk management will "induce moral
apathy" among lawyers "by shifting responsibility for hard normative judgments to others inside the firm");
Margaret Raymond, The Professionalization of Ethics, 33 FoRnHAM URB. L.J. 153, 154, 159-60 (2005) (arguing
that firms' investment in ethics specialists will cause "pressured and overwhelmed lawyers" to "lack ownership
of ethics principles").
. 34. See Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the
Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 441,470-71 (2002) (withdrawing the Commission's support for
law firm discipline on the grounds that it might undermine the accountability of individual partners); Elizabeth
Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119, 125-29 (2005)
(criticizing this objection on theoretical and empirical grounds).
35. See Chambliss, supra note 34, at 145-50 (identifying empirical questions raised by the critique of
professional risk management).
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their management structure, face ethical and regulatory challenges that require an
active investment to meet. Most research suggests that the size of the investment
matters more than the management structure of the firm.36 Moreover, most
research finds that greater investment in firm-level risk management leads to
greater awareness and accountability on the part of individual lawyers.37
I conclude by defining three questions deserving of empirical analysis and
briefly reviewing recent promising research. I also offer prescriptive advice for
law firm leaders, regulators, and legal ethics scholars, including a plea to support
such research. From an academic standpoint, direct access to law firms and law
firm leaders is essential for producing useful, grounded research. From a
regulatory standpoint, it is equally important to develop a grounded, shared
conversation. Large law firms are entering an era of increasing consolidation,
segmentation, and competition, and U.S. regulators increasingly will be called
upon to respond to regulatory developments overseas.38 Currently, the U.S. lags
well behind other jurisdictions in developing an effective regulatory model for
large, multinational partnerships, not to mention alternative organizational
forms. 39 Sustained interaction between law firm leaders, regulators, and research-
ers is essential for developing such a model.
II. THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF LAW FIRM GENERAL COUNSEL
The emergence and structural evolution of the law firm general counsel
position can be divided into three overlapping stages: first, the designation of
individual partners as ethics and risk management specialists, in place of what
36. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 570-83 (examining the effects of direct compensation on the
scope of in-house advising and concluding that "firms get what they pay for").
37. See id. at 577, 586-87; Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1554-55 (discussing partners' use of law firm in-house
counsel); Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of Lawyer
Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETIucs 95, 113 (2008) (explaining how firm-level risk management contributes to
individual ethical awareness).
38. See Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts20O7/ukpga.
20070029_en_1 (authorizing "alternative business structures" for law practice in England and Wales); Christine
Parker, Peering Over the Ethical Precipice: Incorporation, Listing, and the Ethical Responsibilities of Law
Firms 6-7 (Apr. 5, 2008) (paper presented at the Georgetown Law Center Symposium on the Future of the
Global Law Firm, Apr. 17-18, 2008) (on file with author) (explaining the legislation allowing "incorporated
legal practices" (ILPs) in Australia); Steve Mark, The Future of the Global Law Firm: Views from an Australian
Regulator (paper presented at the Georgetown Law Center Symposium on the Future of the Global Law Firm,
Apr. 17-18, 2008) (on file with author) (noting that, due to the General Agreement on the Trade of Services
(GATS), "all jurisdictions must now face the reality of the ILP as a very real, potentially cashed up, participant
in their domestic legal services market").
39. See Elizabeth Chambliss, MDPs: Toward an Institutional Strategyfor Entity Regulation, 4 LEGAL ETincs
45, 45 (2001) (U.K.) (arguing that the U.S. "has no coherent strategy" for the regulation of law firms, much less
multidisciplinary partnerships); Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost
of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 ST'AN. L. REv. 1689, 1695 (2008) (arguing that U.S.
lawyer regulation "stands as a... severe obstacle to the effort to meet the needs of a rapidly transforming
globally competitive economy" and calling for "fundamental changes").
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typically had been a collective, committee function;40 second, the formalization
of the in-house specialist's role as a lawyer for the firm4' and the increasing use of
the title "law firm general counsel" in the press and large law firms; 42 and, third,
law firms' increasing reliance on full-time general counsel and the separation of
the position from that of practicing partners in the firm.43
A. THE DESIGNATION OF SPECIALISTS
The first stage, which had occirred by the late 1990s in most large law firms,44
was the designation of individual partners as ethics and risk management
specialists, in place of what typically had been a rotating, committee function.
45
Most partners explained the change in terms of functional efficiency.46 As firms
grew, and professional regulation became more complex, the work of ethics and
conflicts committees became more complicated, time-consuming, and important,
such that it made sense for the same partner to chair the committee for many
years. Conflicts of interest, in particular, began to require specialized attention.47
Over time, these partners developed expertise and eventually were given formal
titles, such as "ethics advisor," "conflicts partner," "loss prevention partner," and
"firm counsel. 4 8
In some firms, the in-house specialist replaced the original committee, but
more often, the specialist served alongside the committee, which continued to
serve in an advisory capacity.49 As one partner said, "[w]e do have an ethics
committee.., but it doesn't meet ... except under extraordinary circumstances.
[Instead] there are three of us who spend a fair amount of time on ethics work. I
spend almost all my time." [2001-7].50 Another said, "[w]e have a conflicts
40. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 559-65 (examining the- emergence of ethics and risk
management specialists in 32 law firms).
41. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1531-42 (discussing firm counsels' duties to the firm as an entity).
42. See id. at 1519 (reporting industry coalescence around the title "law firm general counsel").
43. See id. at 1521 (discussing the structural separation of firm counsel from partners).
44. Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 564-65 (reporting that "all of the firms in our sample rely on
in-house compliance specialists to some extent... [but] many specialists' positions have been formalized only
recently").
45. See id. at 578-79 (discussing the move from committees to specialists).
46. Id. at 578. As one partner said, "[m]y position was created in the early 90s .... The firm had decided that
committees weren't very efficient so it was going to spin off managerial responsibilities to the serious partners.
..." [2001-14]. Another said: "we started out with a larger committee and it came down to mostly my doing all
the work .... Efficiencies alone suggest that one person is going to end up handling much of this." [2001-27].
Id.
47. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 566 (discussing the centrality of conflicts issues). As one
partner put it: "[w]hen you talk about 'ethics,' some people are just talking about conflicts .... " [2001-13]. Id.
at 567.
48. Id. at 565 (reporting the titles of in-house specialists in 32 law firms).
49. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 568, 578-79 (discussing the relationship between specialists
and committees).
50. Id. at 568 (quoting a full-time conflicts partner at a 500-plus lawyer firm).
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committee that meets as needed. That usually occurs when there is a need for a
collective decision or people are not as willing to accept my decision."
[2001-20].51 As I discuss in Part I, this hybrid structure of specialist-plus-
advisory-committee is typical of large law firm management, with implications
for a theory of managerial authority.
Insurers played an important role in the initial designation of specialists,
especially the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society (ALAS), a mutual insur-
ance company owned by large law firms. 52 ALAS requires that member firms
designate one or more "loss prevention partners" to attend educational confer-
ences and communicate about claims.53 A number of law firm general counsel
started off as ALAS- loss prevention partners, including some who might not
otherwise have developed loss prevention expertise. 4 As one partner observed:
"Being anointed the ALAS representative does not require you to know anything
about ethics.. . but once you are named.. . it's hard to avoid some involve-
ment." [2001-4]. 55
During the first stage, there was no industry standard for the scope or structure
of partners' in-house roles.56 Instead, the in-house role developed gradually and
idiosyncratically within firms. Some partners viewed themselves as in-house
lawyers, whereas others viewed themselves as partners giving collegial advice.57
Likewise, some partners provided in-house service on a volunteer basis, whereas
others billed the firm for their service or were full-time in-house counsel.5 8 At this
stage, the main commonalities were the increasingly centralized management of
ethics and risk management issues, especially conflicts of interest, and the
designation of one or more specialized risk management positions within the
firm.
B. THE FORMALIZATION OF THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
The second stage, which culminated in 2004 and 2005, was the formalization
of the specialist's role as a lawyer for the firm and increasing industry
51. Id. at 579 (quoting a part-time loss prevention partner at a 375-lawyer firm).
52. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 559-60, 590 (discussing the role of ALAS).
53. Id. at 560. In 2002, Robert A. Creamer, then Vice President and Loss Prevention Counsel for ALAS,
estimated that there were over 875 loss prevention partners in ALAS member firms. Id.
54. Id. at 590.
55. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEo. J. LEGAL
E'rncs 335, 348 (2003) (quoting a part-time in-house counsel).
56. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 563-69. As one specialist said, "[g]o to any firm around the
country and you'll find a different way in which the ethics function evolves in that firm .. " [2001-4]. Id. at
565.
57. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1534-40 (discussing the unique ambiguities of the firm counsel role).
58. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 572-73; Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1527-28 (discussing
variations in compensation structure).
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convergence around the title "law firm general counsel."5 9 Again, these
developments were prompted in part by the functional demands of the job. Once
in-house specialists were identified, firms' reliance on them increased, placing
an increasing burden on specialists' outside practices. 60 .As a result, it became
increasingly difficult to treat in-house advising as a casual or volunteer role. As
one partner said:
I see a tension building up. When I first started doing this job it didn't take that
much of my time but I have kind of expanded the role as I have learned more
and become more experienced and my practice has started to shrink. It's what
happens to managing partners, the exact same thing. They see their practice
shrinking, they work themselves out of the market. If you are a managing
partner for five or six years and you step down from that, you don't have any
clients. [2005-3].61
Firms also became concerned about protecting the attorney-client privilege for
communications between in-house specialists and other lawyers in the firm.62 In
63response to several cases denying the privilege for.in-firm communications,
many firms took steps to formally establish the in-house specialist's role as a
lawyer for the firm, for instance by using a lawyer's title, 6 making the position a
full-time position, and appointing firm counsel as an employee rather than an
equity partner.65 One long-term partner, who became his firm's first full-time
general counsel in 1994 (a first-mover), gave up his equity status to underscore
his professional independence.66
Around the same time, law firm management consultants began to administer
59. Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1518-19.
60. See id. at 1554 (discussing the expanding role of firm counsel); Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at
574 (quoting several specialists about the burdens of uncompensated service).
61. Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1554 (quoting a part-time in-house counsel at a 175-lawyer firm).
62. Id. at 1521, 1540-42 (discussing firms'concerns about privilege).
63. See Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287-88 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (holding that "a law firm cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege against a current client when
performing a conflict check in furtherance of representing that client"); Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell,
Trachtman, Logan, Carrie, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 286 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that a law
firm cannot claim the privilege for in-firm communications about a current client); VersusLaw, Inc. v. Stoel
Rives, LLP, 111 P.3d 866, 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege to in-firm communications "must be determined on a case-by-case basis").
64. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1526-27 (reporting that 56% of respondents in the 2005 sample have
titles with "counsel" in them, compared to 31% of respondents in the 2001-02 sample).
65. See Lerer, supra note 5, at 32 (discussing Shutkin's appointment). Theoretically, such efforts should help
preserve the privilege for in-firm communication about a current client. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of
In-Firm Privilege, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1721, 1748-52 (2005) (proposing a structural approach to defining
the scope of in-firm privilege); NYSBA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 789 (2005) (approving a similar
approach). In practice, however, courts continue to confuse the analysis. See Thelen Reid & Priest, LLP v
Marland, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17482 (N.D. Cal. 2007), at 20-21.
66. Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 573. Several survey respondents also report reliniquishing their
equity status at the same time or shortly after they took on a formal in-house role. 2008 ABA ACC Survey, supra
note 28.
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surveys and sponsor conferences for law firm general counsel, leading to
increasing awareness among firms about what other firms were doing, as well as
increasing convergence around the title "law firm general counsel." 67 In 2004,
Altman Weil published its first survey of law firm general counsel in AmLaw 200
firms,6 8 which was widely reported in the legal press.69 In 2002, the Hildebrandt
Institute began sponsoring private roundtables for law firm general counsel,7° as
well as an annual conference for law firm general counsel in New York City.
71
Since 2007, Hildebrandt has co-sponsored the New York City conference with
Hinshaw & Culbertson, a professional liability defense firm and a former
competitor in the risk management conference market.72 Hinshaw also co-
sponsors an annual risk management conference in Chicago.73
C. THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF LAW FIRM GENERAL COUNSEL
Thus, by 2004, many firms had moved toward a professional model for law
firm general counsel: that is, the treatment of the position as a full-time position
with its own professional identity and networks, distinct from that of practicing
partners. The percentage of AmLaw 200 firms with designated general counsel
increased from 63% in 2004 to 85% in 2008.7 4 The percentage of designated
general counsel who are full-time in that role increased from 26% in 2004 to 38%
in 2008.75
By 2004, some firms also had begun to experiment with the appointment of
experienced general counsel from outside of the firm, such as Shearman &
67. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1519-20 (discussing the role of consultants).
68. Altman Weil, Inc., Results of Confidential "Flash" Survey on Law Firm General Counsel (2004) (on file
with author).
69. See, e.g., Jeff Blumenthal, Survey: More Firms Using Their Own GC, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 1,
2005, at 1; Leigh Jones, More Firms Hire General Counsel: GCs Help Reduce the Risk of Liability, NAT'L L.J.,
June 6, 2005, at 1; Jaime Levy, More Firms See Benefit of Using In-House General Counsel, CHi. LAW., July
2004, at 28; Jane Pribek, More and More Law Firms are Designating Their Own 'In-House'General Counsel,
MiNN. LAW., Sept. 26, 2005, at S-1 (special supplement); Nancy Rubin Stuart, A Lawyer's Lawyer: More Firms
Establish In-House General Counsel Positions, N.J. L.J., June 20, 2005, at 27; Charles Toutant, General
Counsel Posts Popping up at Large Firms, Spurred by Insurers, N.J. L.J., Nov. 15, 2004, at 1.
70. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1520 n.28 (discussing the Law Firm General Counsel Roundtable).
71. See Hildebrandt International, The 7th Annual Law Firm General Counsels' Forum, http://
www.hildebrandt.com/HDBTinstitute.aspx?WS-ID=873 (last visited Sept. 10, 2008) (announcing the 7th
Annual Law Firm General Counsels' Forum, in 2008).
72. Id. (stating "[tjhe 2008 forum, for the second straight year, joins together two highly successful annual
conferences: Hildebrandt's Law Firm General Counsels' Forum and Hinshaw & Culbertson's Professional
Responsibility and Risk Management Conference).
73. Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Events-2009 Legal Malpractice and Risk Management Conference,
http://www.hinshawlaw.com/20091mrm/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2008) (announcing the 2009 Legal Malpractice
and Risk Management Conference).
74. Altman Weil, Inc., 2008 Results of Confidential "Flash" Survey on Law Firm General Counsel (Apr.
2008), http://www.altmanweil.comdirdocs/resource/f5b642dd-99a1-423a-a6a1-16bdb67a3464_document.pdf.
75. Id. at 5.
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Sterling's appointment of Shutkin from KPMG International,76 and Akin, Gump,
Strauss, Hauer & Feld's appointment of Richard Goshorn from Actema, an
optical equipment maker. 7 At the time of their appointments, both Shutkin and
Goshorn were optimistic about their positions. Shutkin said, "I feel like a safe
pioneer., 78 Goshom said, "I've heard people say, 'there's no way you can come
from outside and do this job.' That's a hugely insular perspective. Some law firms
need some fresh blood to come in."79
As Shutkin's experience suggests, however, it is an open question whether
professional general counsel can maintain credibility with equity partners. The
first generation of law firm general counsel "grew up" in their firms and have
long-standing ties to firm leaders.8° Thus, even full-time general counsel tend to
retain their professional identities as partners. And while one can point to a few
law firm general counsel who were brought in from outside of their firms,
81
outside appointment from other industries so far has been notably unsuccessful.
Like Shutkin, Goshorn left his law firm within a few years of his appointment.
82
Thus, it may be that the professionalization of law firm general counsel has
reached its limits. Most firms may continue to draw their general counsel from
the partnership ranks, as historically has been the case with managing partners
and chairs. Or it may be that the professionalization of law firm general counsel
will continue, through the development of external labor markets and an
independent professional identity, but at the price of losing the executive status
that most firm counsel currently enjoy.83 Perhaps firm counsel will come to be
viewed primarily as administrators. 84 Or perhaps both models-the "insider" and
the "administrator"-will coexist, but in different firms.
Clearly, however, the demand for dedicated risk management in large law
firms is increasing. Not only are firms increasingly likely to appoint full-time
general counsel, but firm counsel are increasingly likely to have assistant general
76. See Lerer, supra note 5.
77. Cathleen Flahardy et al., Stepping Out: Partner Law Firm GC. Consultant. Entrepreneur Professional
Poker Player Five Options for Adventurous In-House Lawyers, CoRP. LEGAL TtMES, Nov. 2005, at 46, 50
(discussing Goshom's appointment).
78. Lerer, supra note 5 (quoting Shutkin).
79. Flahardy et al., supra note 77, at 46 (quoting Goshorn).
80. Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 581.
81. See Chanbliss, supra note 4, at 1554, 1557 (noting that most outside appointees had previous ties to their
firms).
82. Goshorn left Akin Gump in 2007 to become general counsel at VeriSign, Inc., an intemet security firm.
See VeriSign-Management, https://investor.verisign.com/management.cfm (last visited Sept. 8,2008) (profiling
Goshom).
83. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1546-49 (discussing the potential trade-offs of the professional model,
such as a shift in professional identity from partner to administrator).
84. See id. at 1547 (noting that the first generation of volunteer in-house counsel referred to the lawyers in the
firm as "my guys," whereas professional firm counsel may be more likely to refer to the administrators in the
firm as "my guys").,
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counsel and other specialized management support.8 5 Nearly 50% of firms in the
2008 ABA ACC Survey have more than one designated risk management
position.8 6 Among firms with 500 or more lawyers, 64% have more than one
position. 7 Moreover, most respondents expect their firms' investment in risk
management to increase.88
At the same time, the supply of partners willing to serve as risk managers may
be diminishing. The first generation of law firm general counsel is approaching
retirement and some firm counsel have no obvious successor. Two firm counsel I
interviewed in 2008 said they worry about what would happen if they were "hit
by a bus." [2008-5, 2008-8]. Thus, the "professional project"8 9 of law firm
general counsel is approaching a crossroads. In the words of a full-time general
counsel at one of the nation's largest law firms:
One thing I have been thinking about is succession. When I look around at the
people who hold this position, I see people who backed into it. You were there,
we saw a need, you started part time, and it got to be more and more and more
and more. And since it was within, it tended to be people who knew the firm
and understood the firm and were respected. People with authority. And
now-putting aside what happened with Shutkin and Goshom-the next
generation, where will they come from? [2008-5].
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER TOP MANAGEMENT POSITIONS
Shutkin's experience and the development of the law firm general counsel
position highlight broader questions about the development of executive
authority in large law firms. On one hand, firms' reliance on dedicated
management is increasing. This change is reflected in the evolution of law firm
management titles, which in most large firms now include a variety of titles from
the "C-suite," 90 such as Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer
85. 2008 ABAACC Survey, supra note 28, at 9-10 (discussing firms' increasing investment in in-house risk
management). Over 60% of firms in the survey have designated general counsel, and 15% have assistant general
counsel. Id. at 9 (Table 8).
86. Id. at 10 (Table 9) (reporting the number of designated risk management positions by firm size).
87. Id. Among firms with 500 or more lawyers, 95% (21 of 22) have at least one designated risk management
position, and 64% (14 of 22) have more than one position. Five firms have a full-time specialist plus additional
specialized personnel, and six have a 75-99%-time specialist plus additional personnel. Id.
88. 2008 ABA ACC Survey, supra note 28, at 11 (Table 10). Over half of respondents report that their
in-house role has expanded within the past two years, and that they expect it to continue to expand. Nearly 70%
of respondents in firms with 100-499 lawyers expect the number of designated risk management positions in
their firms to increase. Id.
89. MAGALI SARFAT1 LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFEsSIONALtSM: A SocioLoGicAL ANALYsts 66 (1977)
(referring to the process of collective mobility by which occupational groups seek to enhance their authority and
social standing).
90. Wiktionary, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/C-suite (last visited Oct. 18, 2008) (defining the C-suite as "the
group of 'chief officers' of a business organization, who share nearly equal authority in their respective
functional areas of responsibility").
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(COO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and the like.9 ' In many firms, the title
"Managing Partner," which incorporates both practice and management roles,
has been superseded by one with more executive emphasis, such as Chairman or
CEO.9 2
Meanwhile, a number of firms that have embraced strong centralized man-
agement have been rewarded by dramatic increases in profitability and revenue.
Bingham McCutchen "is run as close to a corporate model as any AmLaw 100
firm" with a chairman, Jay Zimmerman, who "runs the firm like a CEO... and
makes no apologies for it., 93 Under Zimmerman, Bingham has grown from 175
lawyers in 1994 to nearly 1,000 lawyers in 2008 and has "rocketed" up the Am
Law 100 list of top-grossing firms.94 Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe is another
firm that is committed to strong centralized management: CEO Ralph Baxter has
run the firm full-time since 1992.95 In 2004, Orrick had the highest profits-per-
partner of any law firm in the Bay Area.96
On the other hand, partners traditionally have resisted strong centralized
management, at least to the extent that it threatens to encroach upon their
personal authority.97 Law firms also traditionally have been vulnerable to top
partner defections, such that individual partners effectively could veto unwel-
come management initiatives.98 What are the implications of this tension for the
future of law firm management?
Part II examines conventional arguments about the limits of executive
authority in large law firms and identifies several mechanisms for change. I argue
there is an increasing demand for risk management and strategic planning in law
firms, as well as an increasing supply of professionals-a whole industry-
poised to meet this demand, complete with nascent professional institutions, such
as specialized networks and training programs. Moreover, the next generation of
partners will have different expectations of law firm management. Thus, I predict
that executive management will become increasingly autonomous from partners,
both structurally, through the institutionalization of dedicated management
91. See LAW FIRMs YELLow BOOK (Summer 2008) (listing the names and titles of law firm managers).
92. See id. at 41, 242, 529, 843 (identifying the "Chairman" of Baker & McKenzie, the "Joint Chief
Executive Officers" of DLA Piper US LLP, the "Chairman and Managing Partner" of Latham & Watkins LLP,
and the "Executive Partner" of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP).
93. Susan Beck, A Series of Fortunate Events, AM. LAW., Feb. 1, 2005.
94. Id.
95. Koppel, supra note 11, at B3 (discussing Orrick's "visionary ... McKinsey-influenced managerial
techniques," in which the managing partner is a "full-time manager... [who is] intimately familiar with his
business's operations, numbers, and marketing strategies").
96. Marie Beaudette, Swidler in Merger Talks with Orrick, LEGAL TIMES, May 3, 2004.
97. See NELSON, supra note 14, at 90 (arguing that top partners will thwart management initiatives that
threaten their individual authority); Winings, supra note 18, at 189-93 (discussing top rainmakers' tendency to
protect the status quo).
98. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 31, at 338-39 (noting that "it is the threat of leaving" that allows
opportunistic behavior by top partners); Winings, supra note 18, at 190 (arguing that top rainmakers are capable
of "dictating management decisions").
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positions, within firms, and culturally, through partners' increasing reliance on
managers' professional expertise.
To be sure, some law firms will successfully resist this approach, particularly
those that have been the most profitable under the traditional, decentralized
model-such as the handful of highly-prestigious, democratically-managed
Manhattan firms. 99 Such firms also have resisted two-tier partnerships and
"eat-what-you-kill compensation. ' °° However, these prestigious incumbents
"own their market positions."' ' Among most firms, strong centralized manage-
ment promises to make a competitive difference and partners increasingly are
likely to support it.t0 2 Eventually, even the most prestigious firms may begin to
suffer partner and client defections in the face of global competition from
professionally-managed upstarts. 103
Shearman & Sterling may be one such firm. Shearman's profits-per-partner
have been lagging behind other firms "at the top table," t 4 and top partners
have begun to jump ship.10 5 Over the past several years, Weerasinghe has
instituted a number of measures designed to lift profits, 10 6 with limited
99. See, e.g., Koppel, supra note 11 (discussing the management philosophy at Cravath, Swaine & Moore).
According to Vault, the most prestigious law firms in the U.S. are: (1) Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
(2) Cravath, Swaine & Moore, and (3) Sullivan & Cromwell, all of Manhattan. Vault, The Top 100 Most
Prestigious Firms-2009, http://www.vault.com/nr/lawrankings.jsp?law2009=2&ch id=242&topl0o= 1 (last
visited Jan. 23, 2009).
100. See William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single Tier Versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am
Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1742 (2006) (finding that partnership structure is largely a function of firms'
reputational capital); Andrew Longstreth, Partners Beware: Firms are Rijiggering Compensation Schemes. to
Give Star Rainmakers-and Elite Laterals--a Bigger Share of the Pie, Am. LAW., May 7, 2007 (discussing the
"old-fashioned compensation systems" still in place at some prestigious Manhattan firms).
101. Peter D. Zeughauser, Making Lemonade, AM. LAW., May, 2008, at 61; see also Gilson & Mnookin,
supra note 31, at 360-62 (discussing incumbents' competitive advantage in a market characterized by
"significant problems of quality uncertainty"); Royston Greenwood & Laura Empson, The Professional
Partnership: Relic or Exemplary Form of Governance?, 24 ORG. STUD. 909, 913-14 (2003) (discussing the cost
advantages of high status); see also Henderson, supra note 100, at 1745 (noting that firms with a "large quantity
of reputational capital" can be "more forgiving of firm mismanagement").
102. See Zeughauser, supra note 101, at 61 (emphasizing the economic incentives for strategic manage-
ment).
103. See Henderson, supra note 100, at 1749 (arguing that the "sharing ethos of a single-tier structure" can
become a source of finn instability); Longstreth, supra note 100 (discussing the movement of top partners from
Debevoise & Plimpton, Davis Polk & Wardwell, and Cahill, Gordon & Reindel to finns with more attractive
compensation systems); Dan DiPietro, Forecast: Law Firms to Continue Bumpy Ride Through 2008,
http://www.law.comljsp/law/sfb/lawArticleSFB.jsp?id-- 1202423942132 (reporting that a recent industry slow-
down "is hitting the most profitable firms the hardest").
104. Bloomberg, supra note 9 (quoting Kenneth MacRitchie, then the firm's London managing partner).
MacRitchie stepped down from that role and his position on the finn's executive committee as part of the recent
realignment. See Hodges, supra note 2.
105. Bloomberg, supra note 9 (reporting that five partners, including the chief of the firm's asset
management group, left for Vilkie, Farr & Gallagher); Longstreth, supra note 100 (noting that Shearman has
"lost a raft of partners"); Vivia Chen, Homecoming Queen, AM. LAW., Sep. 1, 2005 (discussing China specialist
Carmen Chang's return to Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati after only two years at Shearman & Sterling).
106. See Bloomberg, supra note 9 (discussing organizational and management changes).
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success. 10 7 Now Weerasinghe is experimenting with a management realignment,
based on a return "to the more traditional structure of partner oversight"'' 0 8 over
key functions. Or, in the words of one reporter, "risk management at Shear-
man ... a $921,000,000 firm spread across four continents, with 857 lawyers-
will become a part-time job."'10 9 As this statement reflects, Shearman's ouster of
Shutkin may say more about Shearman than Shutkin." Part In argues that the
future lies with professionally-managed firms.
Il. NEW SOURCES OF MANAGERIAL AuTHORrrY wTm FIRMs
Most commentators acknowledge the increasing demand for dedicated execu-
tive management in large law firms. One can imagine a theoretical debate about
whether dedicated management actually would be better or more efficient for
law firms than decentralized management by committee."' One can also de-
bate the best way to measure the economic performance of firms.12 But for
present purposes, I sidestep those debates. Most commentators agree that strong
centralized management would improve the economic performance of firms.'
13
The claim is that partners will resist such management on ideological or in-
dividual economic grounds.
It is useful to separate the ideological and economic versions of the argument.
The ideological version locates lawyers' resistance to strong centralized manage-
ment in lawyers' professional training and values. For instance, the management
literature argues that lawyers are trained to respect precedent and be resistant to
change, 114 and that lawyers are "professional skeptics," 115 making them prone to
107. In 2000, Shearman & Sterling ranked 13th in profits-per-partner; in 2007, it ranked 22nd
. Longstreth,
supra note 100; Firms A to Z, AM. LAW., May 2008, at 172.
108. Beck, supra note 8 (quoting Shearman & Sterling spokesperson Ron Brandsdorfer).
109. Id.
110. See Longstreth, supra note 100 (stating that Shearman & Sterling "has not kept pace with its peers in the
New York elite"); Matt Byrne & Catrin Griffiths, The Contenders: The Chasing Pack, LAWYER, May 10, 2008,
http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id= 132752 (stating that Shearman "has blown it in recent years");
Vault Prestige Rankings, supra note 99 (reporting that Shearman & Sterling's prestige ranking fell from 14th to
19th in 2009).
111. See Greenwood & Empson, supra note 101, at 926 (theoretical analysis of the benefits of partnership
versus corporate governance).
112. See Rosemarie Clancy & John O'Connor, A Guide to Our Methodology, AM. LAW., May, 2008 at 165
(explaining various measures used by The American Lawyer).
113. See NELSON, supra note 14, at 187 (noting the competitive advantages of bureaucratic management);
Holmes, supra note 17, at 403 (stating that "relegating management decisions to partners all but ensures the
mediocrity of those decisions"); Winings, supra note 18, at 185-86 (stating that it is "undeniable that large firms
can become more efficient and more profitable by adopting a bureaucratic organizational structure").
114. See Wimings, supra note 18, at 185-87 (identifying lawyers' resistance to change as an obstacle to the
implementation of corporate-style management); S. S. Samuelson & Liam Fahey, Strategic Planning for Law
Firms: The Application of Management Theory, 52 U. Pr. L. REv. 435, 439 (1991) (noting firms' attachment
to management strategies "appropriate between 1870 and 1970").
115. David Maister, The Trouble with Lawyers, AM. LAW., Apr. 2006, at 98.
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attack new ideas. Lawyers also tend to value their own skills above those of
others' 6--hence the term "non-lawyer" which has no counterpart in other
professions.1 1 7 Such values arguably make lawyers uniquely difficult to man-
age.
11 8
. Similarly, the professions literature argues that lawyers are taught to expect
significant autonomy in their work and thus are predisposed to resist strong
centralized management.'" 9 Lawyers' demand for autonomy stems in part from
the functional demands of law practice, which requires discretion and indepen-
dent judgment. 20 However, some argue that lawyers---especially partners-are
socialized to expect autonomy even in tasks and decisions beyond their core
expertise. 12 Thus, the strong version of the ideological argument predicts that
partners will value autonomy and control over income. 
122
For instance, in their recent study of the management of transnational law
firms, James R. Faulconbridge and Daniel Muzio criticize arguments about the
emergence of a managerial "archetype," 123 arguing that archetype theory
underemphasizes the role played by professional values. 124 Although they
acknowledge evidence of "a clear departure from the democratic ... traditions of
the [partnership] form," they are skeptical about the prospects for a "wholesale,
uniform and uncontested 'managerial' revolution."'' 25 Instead, they, predict the
emergence of "varieties of professionalism," based on "nationally contingent
116. See Holmes, supra note 17, at 402 (discussing lawyers' disdain for professional managers); Daniel B.
Evans, Why Lawyers Can't Manage: Thoughts From A Frustrated Lawyer, LAW PRAC. MGMT., Oct. 1993, at 26
(same).
117. Winings, supra note 18, at 188 n.170.
118. Maister, supra note 115, at 97-98 (arguing that the same traits that make lawyers professionally
successful make them difficult to manage).
119. See Laura Empson, Your Partnership, in MANAGING THE MODERN LAW FiRM 13 (Laura Empson, ed.,
2007) (summarizing the professions literature); Faulconbridge & Muzio, supra note 19, at 250-54 (drawing on
the professions literature to caution against over-reliance on organizational "archetypes").
120: See Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
370, 372-74 (rev. ed. 1954) (emphasizing the importance of autonomy in lawyers' work); Talcott Parsons, The
Law and Social Control, in LAW AND SOcIOL GY: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 63-64 (William M. Evan ed., 1962)
(same). See also TALCOTr PARSONS & GERALD M. PLArr, THE AmERsCAN UNVEsrrY 123 (1973) (observing a
pattern of "institutionalized individualism" among "professionalized" faculty).
121. Bruce MacEwen, Great Article, But It Should Be Datelined 1994, http://www.bmacewen.com/blog/
archives/2004/09/great article b-print.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2004) (arguing that law firms can no longer
afford to be run by "enthusiastic amateurs").
122. Empson, supra note 119, at 13-14; Winings, supra note 18, at 191 (arguing that top partners will forgo
"tremendous economic gains" in order to maintain their power).
123. See David J. Cooper et al., Sedimentation and Transformation in Organizational Change: The Case of
Canadian Law Firms, 17 ORG. STrUosS 623, 631 (1996) (arguing that the traditional meaning of partnership has
changed in Canadian law firms, and observing the emergence of a competing, managerial archetype). See also
Royston Greenwood & C.R. Hinings, Understanding Strategic Change: The Contribution of Archetypes, 36
AcAD. MGMT. J. 1052 (1993) (explaining the use of archetypes in organizational theory).
124. Faulconbridge & Muzio, supra note 19, at 250-51.
125. Id. at 254.
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work behaviours, beliefs and ideals. ' 126 They write:
lawyers, as professionals, demand autonomy in their work and input into the
strategic direction of the firm. This prevents most forms of hierarchical, top-down
management, makes global coordination of the firm more difficult and makes
negotiations cumbersome as all partners seek to contribute to decision-
making .... [T]hese characteristics and effects of professionalism might...
explain the unique organizational forms used by globalizing [firms] ... [and]
their often suboptimal, irrational and idiosyncratic nature. 
1 27
The economic explanation for partners' resistance to strong, centralized manage-
ment emphasizes law firms' dependence on their top producers, and top partners'
incentives to thwart the development of autonomous management. 28 The gist of
the argument is that top partners have individual economic incentives to protect
the status quo and will use the threat of departure to maintain it. Thus, top partners will
block management changes that would benefit the firm. As Nelson writes:
Unlike the ideal of autonomous management, in which managers develop plans
to maximize organizational goals without regard to their self-interest, it is
difficult for the leaders of law firms to plan objectively about the firm's prac-
tice because they are themselves so strongly identified with certain fields or
clients. The efforts of the client-responsible elite to diversify the client base
could threaten to dilute their power in the organization. This has retarded the
development of rational managerial techniques in many firms and is a
continuing source of uncertainty for partnerships in general. 129
The economic account is not inconsistent with an ideological preference for
autonomy. Presumably, we all value autonomy when we can get it. The question
is, which matters most? The strong version of the ideological argument suggests
that partners will forgo the promise of increased income in order to preserve their
autonomy and control over firm management. But Nelson, at least, rejects this account.
Nelson argues that "[p]rofessional ideology cannot be treated as a structural determinant-
... [but rather] is largely created inside the law firm. '130 Thus, "elites ... can redefine
professionalism to suit their own interests, including the introduction of [b]ureaucratic
managerial practices....,,1 31 As Nelson writes:
126. Id. at 251.
127. Id.
128. See JAY W. LORSCH & THOMAS J. TrERNEY, ALIGNING THE STARs 4,22 (2002) (arguing that the balance of
power in professional service firms "tilts sharply" toward senior producers); NELSON, supra note 14, at 90
(arguing that law firm management "suffers an almost total lack of autonomy" from operations, in contrast to
hospital and university management); Winings, supra note 18, at 189 (discussing dominant rainmakers'
objections to changes in the status quo).
129. NELSON, supra note 14, at 90.
130. Id. at 79.
131. Id. at 206. According to Nelson, "bureaucratic management is defined by: (1) a specialized
policy-making group that actively engages in strategic planning; (2) a developed administrative component
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My interpretation of the resilience of traditional structures in firms has very
different implications from the explanation based on the value-rational
character of the organization .... I suggest that there may not be an inherent
conflict between bureaucratization and professional values. Given a cohesive
managerial elite, a bureaucratic managerial ideology could become the
dominant professional ideology in a law firm. 
132
Thus, .while Nelson's study typically is cited as evidence of partners' tendency
to resist strong centralized management, 133 ultimately the implications of his
analysis depend on the nature of partners' self-interest and the balance of power
within firms. To the extent that top partners would benefit from bureaucratic
management-or be unable to thwart it-Nelson's analysis suggests that bureau-
cratic management practices will develop, because such practices promise to give
firms a market advantage.
134
Framed this way, Nelson's analysis is consistent with the archetype literature,
which emphasizes how professional values are reinterpreted to make sense of
structural change. 135 According to archetype theory, the introduction of strong
centralized management is a defining characteristic of professional service firms
in the global economy.' 36 The archetype literature does not suggest that this
change is "wholesale, uniform and uncontested"; 137 however, neither is it
necessarily thwarted by professional values. 138 Instead, change is the result of a
competition between archetypes, each of which includes an interpretation of
"professional" values.' 3 9 Thus, the adoption of a managerial archetype includes
the promotion of an alternative interpretive scheme.'
40
consisting of a managing partner and a mechanism for collecting and analyzing data on the performance of
individual lawyers and work groups; and (3) well-defined work groups (usually taking the form of departments)
with recognized heads who supervise the group and report to the central policy-making group . Id. at 91-92.
132. Id. at 80.
133. See Winings, supra note 18, at 168-71.
134. NELSON, supra note 14, at 226-27 (stating that "we can expect the trend toward bureaucratization of
professional firms to continue").
135. See C.R. Hinings et al., The Dynamics of Change in Large Accounting Firms, in RESTRUCrURING THE
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION: ACCOUNTING, HEALTH CARE AND LAW 131, 143-51 (David Brock et al., eds.
1999) (examining the dynamics of change in large accounting firms); Laura Empson & Chris Chapman,
Partnership Versus Corporation: Implications of Alternative Forms of Governance in Professional Service
Firms, in 24 RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZAIONS 139, (2006) (examining the dynamics of change
in large consulting firms).
136. See Greenwood & Hinings, supra note 123; Cooper et al., supra note 123, at 629-30 (defining the
characteristics of the managerial archetype).
137. Faulconbridge & Muzio, supra note 19, at 254 (criticizing archetype theory).
138. See Cooper et al., supra note 123, at 635 (stating "[tihere is no unique or changing meaning of ideas
such as professionalism, or partnership").
139. See id. at 624 (discussing the instability that results from competing commitments to different
archetypes); Hinings et al., supra note 135, at 143-47 ("The fact that an alternative archetype has emerged and
achieved a degree of legitimacy does not mean that it will be adopted either uniformly or easily.").
140. See Hinings et al., supra note 135, at 149 (describing a "coup d'etat" in which four partners "stood
together for election on a platform of taking the firm into a... [more managerial] mode").
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The [managerial] archetype interprets a professional as businesslike, as
providing value-adding service and as being responsive to the client. The at-
tributes which sociologists of the professions used to identify as the hallmarks
of a professional, such as education, vocation, esoteric knowledge, self
regulation and civility, have been replaced, or at least augmented, by an
interpretation that stresses punctuality, style, dynamism, financial success and
entrepreneurialism. The meaning of the term "partner" has also changed. In the
[managerial] archetype, a partner is a team player, one who trusts the leadership
and works for the common good .... 141
Archetype theorists acknowledge that the managerial archetype is "articulated
more powerfully in accounting firms" than in law firms. 142 As Royston Green-
wood and Laura Empson write, law is a highly normative profession and thus
may be "institutionally stick[y],, 143 such that organizational change will be
delayed. However, many of the pressures on traditional partnerships that are
found in other industries are also increasingly present in law, especially in large,
multinational firms. 144 Moreover, as more large law firms visibly-and success-
fully--embrace strong centralized management, the pace of change may be
expected to increase. 145 My research points to a number of specific mechanisms
for change.
A. INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION
Perhaps the most important incentive for strong centralized management is the
competition for market position. All signs point to increasing industry consolida-
tion among the AmLaw 200 and their counterparts in the U.K. 146 Merger activity
among U.S. law firms has increased enormously since the late 1990S, 14 7 with a
number of firms pursuing serial mergers to achieve a "credible size and..
platform.
' 14 8
141. Cooper et al., supra note 123, at 631.
142. Id. at 631.
143. Greenwood & Empson, supra note 101, at 927.
144. See Cooper et al., supra note 123, at 631 (discussing the emergence of a managerial archetype in
Canadian law firms); Faulconbridge & Muzio, supra note 19, at 254 (discussing evidence of "important changes
... in the way that law firms are managed" and "growing commercial pressures" in large law firms in particular).
145. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 58-59 (discussing mechanisms for the diffusion of ethical infrastructure
within law firms); Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism
and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 Am. Soc. REv. 147 (1983) (explaining the process and
mechanisms of "institutional isomorphism," by which organizations within a common environment becoming
increasingly alike).
146. See Bruce E. Aronson, Elite Firm Mergers and Reputational Competition: Is Bigger Really Better? An
International Comparison, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 763, 793 (2007) (discussing industry consolidation
among U.S. and U.K. law firms); Randall S. Thomas et al., Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REv. 115, 136-53 (2001)
(explaining law firm consolidation as part of a trend toward consolidation in professional services generally);
Byrne & Griffiths, supra note 110 (reporting accelerated merger activity in the first quarter of 2008).
147. Aronson, supra note 146, at 773 n.16 (discussing the data on law firm mergers).
148. Id. at 765-66.
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Merger activity has a number of consequences for law firm management. First,
mergers are proactive efforts requiring dedicated strategic management and
extensive planning.149 Because of the conflicts of interest rules, mergers also re-
quire coordinated legal and risk management planning. Thus, mergers increase
the functional demand for dedicated, full-time managers. Most of the first law
firms to appoint full-time general counsel were large, national and multinational
firms that faced the challenge of coordinating multiple, far-flung offices. Mergers
only intensify that challenge. In the words of an executive manager at a serially
merging firm:
To do a merger requires a fairly significant amount of management time. You
have to find the firm, negotiate terms, sell it to the firm here, sell it to the target
firm, and integrate it all once it happens. So the firm has to be prepared to take
me off line and spend my time doing that. The firm we merge with may have
$100 million in revenues. I have a $5 million book. And the question is where is
my time better spent. You need to have that mentality in the firm. [2008-6]
Mergers also disrupt the settled expectations of partners, demanding a
proactive interpretive campaign. 150 Mergers require the newly-organized firm to
re-establish its identity, policies, and strategic mission. 15l Thus, mergers provide
an opportunity for flexing the managerial authority of the finn. As one full-time
general counsel observed, following the merger of his multinational firm:
When we went through the combination.., we sat down and said well, we have
[hundreds of] lawyers in [other jurisdictions]... all doing conflicts different-
1 .... At that point, a whole lot of people got different jobs because this is
going to be centralized, there weren't going to be cowboys, there couldn't be
cowboys .... No more clearing your own conflicts. It was a huge jerk for most
people .... We knew that conflicts was going to be the largest issue ... and if
we didn't get it right it was going to be a big, big problem. [2001-8].152
Industry consolidation also leads to more enduring relationships with cli-
ents, 153 thus shifting some control over clients from individual partners to the
firm. The legal press is full of news about "preferred provider" arrangements
149. June D. Bell & Aric Press, Law Firm Leaders Have Mergers on the Mind, LAW FIRM INc., (Jan.-Feb.
2007), http://www.law.comljsp/article.jsp?id=1170928976695 (discussing the importance of professional
managers in guiding law firm merger decisions); Anthony Lin, Law Firm Merger Consultants Race for Booming
Business, N.Y. L. J., June 24, 2002 (describing the busy market for merger consulting).
150. See Aronson, supra note 146, at 777 n.30 (noting that mergers can be "highly disruptive" and may even
lead to the dissolution of the firm); Anthony Lin, Coudert Breakup Voted After Merger Talks Fail, NAT'L L. J.,
Aug. 19, 2005 (discussing the failed merger of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe and Coudert Brothers).
151. See Laura Empson, Organizational Identity Change: Managerial Regulation and Member Identifica-
tion in an Accounting Firm Acquisition, 29 Accr., ORG. & Soc'y 759 (2004) (exploring the impact of an
acquisition on organizational and professional identity).
152. Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1543.
153. See Aronson, supra note 146, at 793 (discussing client consolidation in U.S. and U.K. law firms).
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offered by clients such as Tyco, 54 Microsoft, 155 and Pfizer. 156 Some argue that
large law firms and their clients are moving toward a joint venture model.157 To
the extent that large law firms form more enduring relationships with clients, it
undercuts individual partners' ability to dictate management practices in the firm.
Finally, industry consolidation means that surviving firms will be bigger,
making it all the more .difficult for any one partner or group of partners to disrupt
the strategic direction of the firm. The sheer scale of some law firms already
makes it difficult for even the top rainmakers to dominate executive management.
In the words of the general counsel of a 1,000-plus lawyer firm, "a big advantage
of our size is that there is not a partner who is bigger than the firm, by a long shot.
No one is going to dominate our institutional structure. And that is comforting."
[2008-1].
B. PROFESSIONAL NETWORKS
A second mechanism that is likely to promote the authority of executive
managers is the development of professional networks among managers and
management consultants. In recent years, law schools, business schools, and
consultants have begun to offer formal training programs for law firm manag-
ers. 1 58 In 2004, Reed Smith teamed up with the Wharton School of Business to
create Reed Smith University, which offers a year-long curriculum on law firm
leadership, management, and business development. 59 Hildebrandt Interna-
tional, a law firm management consultant, offers a five-month course on law firm
management that leads to a graduate certificate from George Washington
University.1 60 In 2007, Harvard Law School instituted an executive education
program for "high-level managing partners and practice group leaders" 161 and
154. See Richard Lloyd, How Eversheds Became Tyco's Firm of Choice in Europe, Am. LAW., Mar. 11,2008,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1205146040947 (reporting the deal between Eversheds and Tyco);
Steve Hoare, Tyco Adds New Demands in Second Eversheds Deal, THE LAWYER, Aug. 26, 2008, at http://
www.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id= 132779&d=415&h=417&f=416 (reporting Tyco's renewal of the
$10 million deal).
155. See Leigh Jones, Microsoft to Offer Diversity Bonuses, NAT'L LJ., July 22, 2008 (discussing
Microsoft's 17 "Premier Preferred Provider law firms, which collectively receive about $150 million in fees
from the technology giant each year'.').
156. See Eriq Gardner, Pfizer Mounts Grueling Competition To Pick Preferred Law Firm Providers,
N. Y. L. J., Nov. 3, 2005 (discussing firms' competition for "20 coveted spots as preferred providers").
157. See David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons from the
Diversity Wars, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 855, 887-89 (1998); David B. Wilkins, Toward a Joint Venture Model
(June 1, 2008) (paper presented at the Fordham Law School Legal Ethics Schnooze) (on file with author).
158. See Leigh Jones, Training Leaders a Top Priority, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 2005, at 1 (discussing the market
for law firm leadership training).
159. Jeff Blumenthal, Reed Smith Lawyers Head Back to School, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 13, 2004,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1090180329489.
160. Jones, supra note 158, at 1.
161. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, PROGRAM ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, http://
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pdfs/2007-PLP.pdf at 12 (last visited Jan. 23, 2009) (describing the program).
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appointed a Faculty Chair of Executive Education to run it. 
162
Consultants also have begun to sponsor events and roundtables for law firm
leaders. For instance, the Hildebrandt Institute offers "workshops and seminars
focused on particular leadership and management topics... shorter breakfast
briefings and seminars scheduled in cities throughout the US and the UK, [and]
in-house workshops customized, to meet the... needs of particular firms.
1 63
Zeughauser Group offers leadership roundtables aimed at law firm chairs and
CMOs, as well as firm-level consulting on strategic planning, business develop-
ment, positioning, and mergers and acquisitions.164
These programs and events provide opportunities for law firm managers to
make professional contacts, exchange information, and develop shared profes-
sional norms. 165 Professional networks may be especially important during the
initial testing period for new management ideas and strategies. 166 Several
participants in our initial focus groups for law firm in-house counsel were
explicitly grateful for the opportunity to discuss their duties and challenges with
their peers from other firms..16 7 As one fledgling in-house counsel observed, "[the
previous speaker] just said about ten things I know I ought to be doing and I
don't." [2001-3].168 Interaction at conferences and roundtables also raised firm
counsels' awareness of their ethical duties to the firm and the limits on in-firm
privilege. 169
Ready access to inter-firm networks and information about other firms'
practices also helps to promote the authority of individual managers. Several law
firm general counsel who were appointed from outside of their firms report
appealing to community standards to bolster their managerial authority. The
following comment comes from a full-time general counsel at a 450-lawyer firm:
I have not grown up shoulder to shoulder with these people who are now
partners in the firm. But when you come from the outside you can tell everyone
"that's how other firms do it; that's how our peer firms do it" and that is like the
ace of trumps .... Three or four times I have come in and said, we should do
162. Id. at 8 (reporting Ashish Nanda's appointment as Faculty Chair of Executive Education). Nanda
previously was on the Harvard Business School faculty. Id.
163. Hildebrandt Institute, http://www.hildebrandt.com/HDBTlnstitute.aspx?WPID=231 (last visited
Jan. 23, 2009).
164. Zeughauser Group, http://www.zeughausergroup.comconsulting/consultingservices.asp (last visited
Jan. 23, 2009).
165. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1570 (emphasizing the importance of professional networks among law
firm in-house counsel); Lauren B. Edelman & Marc C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations,
23 ANN. RaV. Soc. 479, 498-502 (1997) (reviewing research on the role of lawyers and human resource
professionals in defining organizations' responses to their legal environments).
166. See Chambliss, supra note 39, at 57-58 (explaining institutional theories of organizational change).
167. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 589-91 (reporting participants' comments about the benefits
of exchange).
168. Id. at 577.
169. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1538-42.
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X, and there has been a lot of squawking, and I've said, as a kind of a gambit,
let me talk to our peer firms, eight or ten firms, and find out how others do it,
and I already know the answer. Or sometimes it is educational... I'll ask them
to make the calls. I'll say, "look, why don't you call a few people and see what
they do and get back to me." And we end up getting to the right answer.
[2005-1].
Finally, many law firm management consultants themselves are former
managing partners and thus have personal and professional incentives to promote
the authority of the executive role. For instance, Ron Beard, who helps to run
Leadership Roundtables for the Zeughauser Group,"7 was the Chairman of
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher from 1991 to 2001.171 James W. Jones, Chairman of
the Hildebrandt Institute and Vice President of Hildebrandt International, was
Managing Partner of Arnold & Porter from 1986 to 1995.172 Carl A. Leonard of
Hildebrandt was the*Chairman of Morrison & Foerster from 1984 to 1993.173
Both Jones and Leonard have written articles urging law firms to embrace the
CEO model and increase compensation for law firm chief executives.
1 74
Thus, while law firms may not yet be ready to appoint executive managers
from outside of the firm, many firms are willing to contract with experienced
leaders for professional management consulting. 175 This consulting market
promotes the legitimacy of law firm management as a distinct professional skill,
separate from that of practicing partners.
C. GENERATIONAL CHANGE
A third factor likely to hasten the acceptance of professional management is
generational change among partners. Already many large firm partners have no
direct experience with the traditional trappings of partnership. As widely
lamented, even equity partnership in large law firms is not what it used to be. 1
76
In place of job security, a decreased workload, and a significant voice in firm
170. Leadership Roundtables, http://www.zeughausergroup.com/roundtable/leadershiproundtable.asp (last
visited Jan. 23, 2009) (listing Beard as a contact).
171. Profile of Beard, http://www.zeughauser.com/partners/Partners-Ron.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
172. Profile of Jones, http://www.hildebrandt.com/Consultant.aspx?PpID=3856 (last visited Jan. 23,
2009).
173. Profile of Leonard, http://www.hildebrandt.com/Consultant.aspx?Ppl-ID=3868 (last visited Jan. 23,
2009).
174. See Leonard, supra note 17 (urging firms to develop "executive incentive packages for managing
partners"); James Jones & Carl Leonard, The Price of Leadership: A New Look at Setting Compensation for
Managing Partners, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 10, 2002, at 5 (arguing that "visionary and inspiring leaders are...
essential" for large law firms).
175. Julia Ben-is, White & Case Hires McKinsey for Global Review, THE LAWYER, Jul. 28, 2008 (reporting
the firm's contract with McKinsey for "a worldwide strategic review of the firm's business").
176. Marc Galanter & William D. Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: The Second Transformation of the
Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REv. 102, 128 (2008) (arguing, that there has been a "fundamental shift in what it
means to be a partner in a major corporate law firm"); David B. Wilkins, Partner, Shmartner! EEOC v. Sidley
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governance, today partnership is just another stage in an unending "elastic
tournament," based on "a constant focus on the real or imagined marginal product
of each individual lawyer in the firm."' 17 7 Thus, many partners may be
discontented with the current meaning of partnership or at least have no
investment in maintaining it. 
1 78
Moreover, lawyers over fifty-five are a decreasing percentage of the lawyers in
large law firms. 179 Younger partners who come of age in large, multinational law
firms will have different expectations of law firm management. ' 80 Many younger
partners may think nothing of deferring to CEO-style leaders or even non-lawyer
managers. As one full-time general counsel observes:
When you talk about the corporate model: law firms are going to have to turn to
that. We have to. Firms have hundreds of partners around the world and
whatever you call them, it is not the same. Law firms are reluctant to do it, but
when you look around and are honest about it, that evolution is already well
underway. Our Chief Operating Officer has an MBA, he is not a lawyer. Our
Chief Financial Officer is a CPA, not a lawyer. Is it hard for them to get respect
without the JD? Well, maybe. But law firms are changing. There are people
who have been in firms for 15 years and they have always had COOs and CFOs
and give them respect and authority. Much more so than lawyers of another
generation. [2008-5].
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERIAL AUTHORITY
All of these mechanisms point to the declining influence of individual partners
and the increasing authority and legitimacy of dedicated, professional managers.
Of course, this change will not be uniform or uncontested within firms. On the
contrary, most firms are likely to exhibit some measure of internal incoherence
and conflict as they move from a traditional partnership to a more managerial
archetype. 18 1 Moreover, from a structural standpoint, "professional" manage-
Austin Brown & Wood, 120 HARv. L. REV. 1264, 1271 (2007) (stating that senior lawyers "who retain the
traditional trappings of ownership ... are rapidly becoming a scarce breed").
177. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 176, at 142-43. According to longitudinal data collected by Altman
Weil, billable hours for partners in their 25 th to 29
th year of practice have climbed from 1,538 in 1985 to over
1,700 in 2003. Id. at 127.
178. See Hinings et al., supra note 135, at 145 (discussing the tension between young and old partners in the
major accounting firms as "younger partners have shown themselves unwilling to support their older
colleagues").
179. Galanter, supra note 32, at 1097.
180. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 176, at 157-64 (discussing the expectations of"millennial lawyers");
John Flood, Future Directions in UK Legal Profession: Life After the Legal Services Act 2007 (paper presented
at the Georgetown Law Center Symposium on the Future of the Global Law Firm, Apr. 17-18, 2008) (on file
with author) (discussing the expectations of lawyers in "Generation Y").
181. C.R. HtNINGS & ROYSTON GREENWOOD, THE DYNAMICS OF STRATEGIC CHANGE 28 (1988) (discussing the
incoherence that can result when firms operate under two contradictory archetypes); Hinings et al., supra note
135, at 145 (identifying specific fault lines that have developed within accounting firms, for instance between
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ment may look very similar to "traditional" management, with a top executive,
drawn from practice, who-along with a committee of elite practitioners-
oversees an increasingly specialized team of professional managers.18 2 Indeed,
this is more or less the structure of management in every large law firm.
But structural patterns are just one indicator of professional managers'
authority. 183 From a cultural standpoint, a discernable shift is occurring. Large
law firms increasingly are investing in dedicated executive management, and
executive managers are becoming increasingly professionally independent from
partners. Part IV considers the implications of these changes for large law firm
culture-particularly partners' attention to (and interpretation of) legal ethics.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT
The legal ethics literature tends to be suspicious of professional management.
Part of the suspicion stems from concerns about specialization and the potential
trade-off between centralized management and individual accountability. For
instance, Margaret Raymond argues that the "professionalization of ethics"'
1 8 4
will lead "pressured and overwhelmed lawyers" to shirk their ethical duties.1
85
According to Raymond:
The internal focus on ethics specialists ... suggests that ethics is just another
area of specialization, one in which someone else is developing expertise so
you don't have to. This runs the risk of shuttling the consideration of ethics to
the designated individuals, taking ethical issues out of mainstream dis-
course. 186
Likewise, Anthony Alfieri argues that firms' increasing investment in profes-
sional risk management will "induce moral apathy" among lawyers, "by shifting
responsibility for hard normative judgments to others inside the firm., 187 U.S.
regulators have raised similar objections to proposals for law firm discipline,
arguing that the regulation of law firms as entities will undermine individual
lawyers' accountability for supervision.'
88
accounting and consulting and between young and old partners); Cooper et al., supra note 123, at 643-44
(emphasizing the importance of "oscillations" and "unresolved excursions" as organizations work through
competing commitments to alternative archetypes).
182. The archetype literature uses the geological metaphor of "sedimentation." See Cooper et al., supra note
123, at 624 ("[O]rganizational change represents not so much a shift from one archetype to another, but a
layering of one archetype on another.").
183. See Cooper et al., supra note 123, at 633-34 (noting that even incremental structural change may reflect
a profound shift in professional values); Empson, supra note 119, at 28 (noting that "formal governance
structures only represent one aspect of managerial authority").
184. Raymond, supra note 33, at 153.
185. Id. at 159-60.
186. Id.
187. Alfieri, supra note 33, at 1139.
188. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 124-27 (discussing the law firm discipline debate).
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Professional management also tends to be associated with other structural
characteristics that arguably make it difficult for law firms to maintain a strong
ethical culture, such as large size, departmentalization, and geographic disper-
sion.189 In their recent article on the elastic tournament, for instance, Marc
Galanter and William Henderson argue that "culture inevitably becomes weaker
as law firm partnerships become larger and more geographically dispersed."'1 90
In our discussions with lawyers, we have run across examples of large law firms
that continue to share risk and inspire investment and sacrifice for the collective
enterprise of the firm. Ethical lapses threaten a hallowed firm's reputation and the
trust of longtime colleagues. But this ethos becomes harder to maintain (and virtually
impossible to create or restore) in larger, geographically dispersed finns that are
perpetually competing for clients and entry-level associates. 191
Yet much of the criticism of professional management in the legal ethics
literature stands on shaky theoretical ground. First, at least some measure of
scholars' suspicion is ideological. Like practicing lawyers, legal ethics scholars
tend to be influenced by a traditional archetype in which bureaucratic structures,
such as professional managers, automatically are seen as interfering with and
corrupting some purer form of collegial interaction and culture. 192 Thus, much of
the criticism of professional management is based on a false comparison between
actual, modem law firms and some nostalgic, collegial ideal. 193 Galanter himself
has criticized this nostalgic approach to the field. 1
94
The ethics literature also tends toward a strong structural determinism that
leads it to overstate the normative implications of new structural forms-such as
limited liability partnerships, 195 multidisciplinary partnerships, 196 and incorpo-
rated legal practices. 197 Yet most evidence suggests that the consequences of even
189. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 176, at 106-07 (stating "large law firms have grown to truly
behemoth proportions, aided in part by a large cadre of professional lawyer-managers").
190. Id. at 133.
191. Id.
192. See Chambliss, supra note 34, at 119-36 (discussing the "nirvana fallacy" in law firm regulation debates).
193. Id. at 121.
194. See Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. REv. 549,
550-52 (1996) (criticizing "nostalgia for the good old days" in "contemporary discourse about law practice").
This tendency is not unique to American lawyers. See John Leubsdorf, On the History of French Legal Ethics,
8 U. CH. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 341,346 (2001) (noting that discussions of legal ethics in France are pervaded by
nostalgic historical narratives).
195. See Allan W. Vestal, Special Ethical and Fiduciary Challenges for Law Firms Under the New and
Revised Unincorporated Business Forms, 39 S. Thx. L. REv. 445, 475 (1998) (arguing that partners in an LLP
"have less incentive to supervise than they would in a general, nonlimited liability partnership setting").
196. See Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and
Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2000) (arguing that
MDPs "threaten[] to destroy the foundation of professional independence, loyalty and confidentiality that the
lawyers of America have always promised the public").
197. See Steven Mark, Harmonization or Homogenization? The Globalization of Law and Legal Ethics -An
Australian Viewpoint, 34 VAND). J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 1173 (2001) (summarizing the objections to incorporation).
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radical structural change are contingent on a host of local and environmental
factors, including cultural variation among firms.198 Thus, there is little reason to
assume that structural change will have uniform, uncontested results.
To be sure, the increasing centralization of law firm management and the
growing professional distance between managers and practicing partners pose
challenges for managers, partners, and firms. Coordination and cultural integra-
tion, in particular, are likely to be continuing challenges.1 99 But these challenges,
in some form, are present in all. large, multi-office firms. If anything, the
increasing authority and legitimacy of executive managers should help to
facilitate an effective response.2°°
A. FALSE COMPARISONS
Nostalgia tends to lead ethics scholars to overstate the differences between
prior and current conditions of practice in large law firms. For instance,
Raymond's concern that firms' increasing reliance on in-house ethics specialists
will "tak[e] ethical issues out of mainstream discourse, ' 20 1 implies that ethical
issues otherwise would be part of mainstream discourse in large law firms.
20 2
Likewise, Alfieri's argument that "morally lethargic ' 20 3 lawyers will not
contribute to the maintenance of centralized risk management systems suggests
that lethargic lawyers would contribute to collegial, decentralized efforts.
Yet most research finds that the baseline level of ethical awareness and
dialogue in large law firms is relatively low-even without the introduction of
ethics specialists or professional risk managers.2° Meanwhile, ethics specialists
and risk managers report begin bombarded with questions from "pressured and
overwhelmed" lawyers who are delighted to have a resource when ethical
questions arise.20 5 As one full-time firm counsel reports, "People call me at home,
198. See Cooper et al., supra note 123, at 624 (characterizing organizational change in Canadian law firms as
"a complex and historical process of faults and disruptions... for example from local crises and conflicts").
199. See LORSCH &TrERNEY, supra note 128, at 125 (discussing the importance of organizational matrices to
"blend[] the management side of the firm with the client-oriented side"); Wilkins, supra note 157, at 1277
(stating "it is necessary to articulate a vision of what it means to be a partner in a major law firm that
acknowledges, but ultimately transcends, both partner self-interest and the economic value that senior lawyers
must bring to their firms").
200. See Empson, supra note 119, at 33 (stating "it is up to the managers of the professional service firms to
insure that the partnership [ethos] evolves rather than simply becoming extinct" [emphasis in the original]).
201. Raymond, supra note 33, at 159-60.
202. See Chambliss, supra note 34, at 134 (criticizing Raymond's analysis).
203. Alfieri, supra note 33, at 1940.
204. Chambliss, supra note 34, at 134 (arguing that the conditions that Raymond fears are already present in
many firms); Suchman, supra note 14, at 858-59 (reporting that large law firms conduct "very little routine
ethical evaluation"); Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary Observa-
tions, 67 FoRDHAm L. REv., 709, 717 (1998) (reporting that large firm lawyers are overburdened and there is "no
time to think").
205. Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1565.
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and everything is an emergency. I was going to wallpaper my office with those
little yellow message slips, all of them say 'it's an emergency, please call me
within the next five minutes.' I could work 24 hours a day." [2002-2].206 Thus,
there is no empirical basis for portraying the "professionalization of ethics ' 20 7 as
the source of the problem of ethical shirking. Instead, firms' investment in
professional risk management is one potential response to that problem.2 °s
A false comparison also underlies some of the skepticism about the authority
and effectiveness of professional managers. For instance, the argument that
professional managers will not have sufficient authority with partners implies
that professional managers rely on fundamentally different sources of authority
than practicing partners who manage on the side. Skeptics tend to equate
professional management with "hierarchical, top-down ' 20 9 management based
on bureaucratic controls.
Yet research finds that professional managers-in both corporations and
professional firms-tend to rely on the same techniques as traditional managing
partners; that is, listening, negotiation, and consensus building. 210 For instance,
most law firm general counsel, regardless of the structure of their position, report
that their authority stems primarily from personal credibility and the ability to
persuade partners of the merits of their advice.21' The process they describe is
largely educational, not hierarchical. One-full-time general counsel explains his
strategy as follows:
To be most effective, you have to go through a process of convincing your
colleagues that "I'm not saying no, I'm just telling you all these things be-
cause eventually you are going to say no, and we are going 'to get where we
want". ... Standing up in front of a group and saying "thou shalt not"--it
tends not to work very effectively when you have 600 owners of a firm and
each one believes he or she is autonomous [2001-7].212
Many firm counsel attribute their credibility to long-term relationships with
partners;213 but even firm counsel from outside of the firm can establish the
necessary credibility over time. As one in-house counsel explains:
206. Id.
207. Raymond, supra note 33, at 153.
208. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1559-68 (finding that firms' investment in in-house counsel has
significant positive effects); Davis, supra note 37, at 113 (arguing that "the relationship between [individual]
ethics and risk management is entirely complementary").
209. Faulconbridge & Muzio, supra note 19, at 251.
210. See LORSCH & TRNEY, supra note 128, at 178 (quoting one chief executive who refers to himself as
"chief listening officer"); Andrew Jones, The Global City Misconceived: The Myth of "Global Management" in
Transnational Service Firms, 33 GEOFORUM 335, 346 (2002) (arguing that "[g]lobal corporate strategy is a
negotiated and fluid phenomenon that emerges ... from a continual process of discussion").
211. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1549-58 (discussing the nature of firm counsels' authority).
212. Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 588.
213. Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1550.
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I was kind of dropped in from outside. I was the director of the state lawyers'
board. And it did take some time both to get to know people and for me to get to
know, particularly-I was a trial lawyer... [and] I remember somebody
talking about, "I have a securitization question," and [thinking], "that sounds
like a security. What is it?" That type of thing. It took a while to get up to speed.
But I think that's manageable over a period of time. [2001-14I.214
This is not to suggest that there are no normative implications of professional
management or that concerns about professional managers' authority and ef-
fectiveness are misplaced. Rather, it is a matter of emphasis. The professionaliza-
tion of law firm management-and the growth and bureaucratization of law firms
more generally-is an incremental process. Thus, the selection of benchmarks is
critical. To the extent that analytical benchmarks are based on nostalgia, or
untested assumptions about the actual conditions of practice, both empirical and
normative analysis will suffer.
B. STRUCTURAL DETERMINISM
The ethics literature also tends toward a crude structural determinism that
assumes that changes in formal structure will have unmediated normative
impact.21 5 For instance, much of the debate about the ethical implications of
alternative organizational forms, such as limited liability partnerships, multidisci-
plinary partnerships and incorporated legal practices, assumes that such forms
present qualitatively different ethical challenges from traditional forms. 216 Yet
most of the ethical challenges associated with alternative forms already are to
some extent present in the traditional partnership form.21 7 And though research is
scarce, what research there is offers little support for form-of-practice effects. 2t 8
Likewise, most commentators assume that the structure of law firm manage-
ment positions-that is, part-time versus full-time, or inside versus outside
appointment-will have predictable consequences for managers' authority and
effectiveness. But this assumption, too, lacks empirical support.2 t9 In most firms,
214. Id. at 1554.
215. See Parker, supra note 38, at 29 (discussing lawyers' tendency toward "moral panic"). "There are always those
who say that whatever is the latest development in professional practice... marks the point at which legal practice has
finally ditched all the ethical ideas of professionalism and careened over the precipice." Id.
216. See supra notes 195-197.
217. See Chambliss,.supra note 39, at 45 (arguing that many of the problems identified by opponents of
multidisciplinary partnerships already exist in single-discipline firms); Parker, supra note 38, at 4 (arguing that
"the ethical dangers that commentators worry will come with incorporation and listing are a formalisation and
accentuation of existing ethical pressures on legal practice, rather than a fundamental change").
218. See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Economics of Limited Liability: An Empirical Study of
New York Law Firms, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 107, 110 (finding that the move from a general partnership to a
limited liability partnership had no significant effect on partners' relationships with each other, including their
willingness to pitch in on matters or monitor each others' work); Parker, supra note 38, at 18-28 (case study of
Slaters & Gordon, the first law firm in the world to be listed on the stock exchange).
219. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1551 (questioning the structural theory of firm counsels' authority).
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the formal structure of management is significantly path-dependent. 220 As a
result, the formal title and structure of a particular management position may have only
a loose correspondence with the actual scope and authority of the role.22
Moreover, regardless of their structural position--or their own views about
the importance of structure-firm counsel agree that the primary determinant
of their effectiveness is the level of management support.222 As one firm counsel
put it, "none of this stuff works unless you have the power of the firm behind
you. Whether or not you have individual power or how you get things done,
whether it's because you are a big rainmaker or have a pleasing personality, you
need [top management support]" [2001-13].223 Or, in the words of another firm
counsel:
Leadership matters. It sounds like a clichd but it is true. If you have support at
the top, from management, you've got it, and if you don't, you don't. And some
guys with big books are team players and that really changes things.... If Cal
Ripken is the first to practice and helps pick up the bats, it is hard to be a prima
donna on that team [2008-2].
Thus, while it is important to be attentive to structural change within firms, as
well as to the potential effects of new organizational forms, it is also important
not to make a fetish of traditional structures and forms. Research on the structural
evolution of the law firm general counsel position shows that formal structure is a
weak predictor of managerial authority and the ethical culture of the firm.224
Instead, the key variable is the level of overall management investment.225 In
most cases, firms' move toward dedicated, professional management represents
an increased investment in management and the level of accountability within the*
firm. In general, then, dedicated management should be expected to improve
ethical accountability within firms.
V. CONCLUSION
As this Article goes to press, The Lawyer reports that Allen & Overy is "in talks
with Shearman & Sterling" about a possible merger.226 Part of the U.K. Magic
220. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 565-70 (discussing the evolutionary nature of the in-house
position).
221. Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1527 (finding that "respondents' titles do not reliably indicate the structure
or function of their in-house role").
222. Id. at 1555-57 (discussing the importance of management support).
223. Id. at 1555.
224. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 578-83 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of
different management structures).
225. Id. at 577 (concluding that "firms get what they pay for").
226. A&O, Shearman to Merge?, THE LAWYER, Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.
cgi?id= 134953&d=415&h=417&f=416 (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
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Circle and the so-called "transatlantic elite, ' 22 7 Allen & Overy's 2007-08 reve-
nues came in at £1.02 billion, making it the fourth Magic Circle firm to break the
billion pound barrier.228 According to The Lawyer, Allen & Overy's search for
"a market-busting merger" is behind senior partner David Morley's secondment
to New York for three months.229 Allen & Overy already has "nicked a whole
load of Shearman's Germans., 230 And besides, says The Lawyer: "Shearman
needs help. (Actually, this is incontrovertible.)
231
Of course, it is risky to write about merger gossip in a law review article. The
merger market is far too volatile and even accurate gossip is soon dated. But the
overture itself is interesting. It would be interesting to see who would manage
that firm. Shearman obviously is the weak sister.232 Talk about a management
realignment.
One thing is clear: the era of the gentleman manager is coming to a close. Large law
firms are multimillion and increasingly billion dollar enterprises that demand
sophisticated management expertise in their core as well as peripheral functions.
Although the vast majority of the current generation of executive-level managers
come from practice and were appointed from the partnership ranks of their firms,
top managers increasingly have a distinct professional identity as managers and
participate in increasingly specialized networks outside of their firms. On his
"lawyer profile" David Morley fists his practice area as "management."
233
There has been surprisingly little research on the evolution of law firm man-
agement-and virtually none in the U.S.-since Nelson's study. It is as if the
possibility of an archetypal shift were unimaginable. But, as I have argued, the
conventional wisdom about the limits of managerial authority in law firms is
dated. The current conditions of competition and consolidation among firms have
created new incentives for centralized management and new sources of executive
authority within firms. Researchers--and regulators--should pay attention. Three
questions, in particular, invite systematic analysis.
227. Matt Byrne, Introducing the Sweet Sixteen, THE LAWYER, May 10, 2008, http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-
bin/item.cgi?id= 132761 (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
228. Alex Spence, Allen & Overy's £1 Billion Turnover Confirms London as Centre of the Legal World,
TIMs ONLwE, Jul. 4, 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tollbusiness/law/article4265365.ece (last visited
Jan. 23, 2009).
229. A&O, Shearman to Merge?, supra note 226 (stating that Morley's move is "being taken in New York as
proof that a deal is in the offing").
230. Id. (referring to Allen & Overy's hiring of four partners from Shearman's Frankfurt office).
231. Id.
232. See Spence, supra note 228 (reporting that Allen & Overy's top partners made £1.6 million in 2007-08,
or about $3.2 million). Shearman & Sterling's profits-per-partner were $1.4 million in 2007. Richard Lloyd,
For a Few Dollars Less: A Sliding Dollar and Resurgent Brits Pose a Challenge for U.S. Firms in London, AM.
LAW., Jun. 1, 2007. See also Elie Mystal, Law Firm Merger Mania: Allen & Overy + Shearman & Sterling =
A&S&S??, ABovE ThE LAW, Oct. 6, 2008, http://abovethelaw.com/2008/10/lawfirm.-mergergerania.aossas.php
(describing Allen & Overy as "a revenue monster" and Shearman & Sterling as "facing strong headwinds").
233. Allen & Overy LLP, Lawyer Profiles, David Morley, http://www.legal500.comfirms/82-allen-overy-llp/
offices/5-london/lawyers/4101 (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
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First, what is the formal authority structure in AmLaw 200 firms? Or, for that
matter, AmLaw 100 firms? How much do management and governance
structures vary by city? By size? By year of founding? Or by the primary practice
areas of the firm? How have management and governance structures changed
over time? Currently, we lack even basic descriptive information about law firm
management. The Law Firms Yellow Book, an annual directory, provides some
information, such as the names and titles of law managers, and could be
cross-referenced with other annual data on firms. In addition, however, research-
ers need access to law firm partnership agreements and oral histories from firm
members.
Secondly, how is succession handled? Succession emerges as perhaps the key
question in considering the future development of executive management in large
law firms. Again, such research would require access to partnership agreements
and formal procedures for succession; but ideally researchers also would conduct
case studies of succession-and other forms of transition, such as merger-in
particular firms. Such research is a staple of the management literature, which
focuses mainly on professional service firms other than law firms.234 Increas-
ingly, however, business and management researchers are becoming interested in
large law firms.23 The management.literature provides one coherent approach to
a theory of law firm management, as well as rich comparative data.
Finally, there is the messy issue of law firm culture. What does it mean to talk
about firm culture in volatile, multi-office firms? How might such a construct be
measured? Legal scholars only recently have begun "taking law firms seriously"
236
as an important arena-and agent--of professional conduct. 237 But scholars' increas-
ing attention to the firm as a unit of analysis has coincided with a period of exponential
growth, geographic expansion, and volatility among firms--especially the large,
corporate law finns that dominate the legal services market.238
Thus, while "firm culture" tends to do a lot of work in the legal ethics
literature, this construct is rarely measured--or defined. This issue is ripe for
234. See Empson, supra note 151 (case study of a global accounting firm's acquisition of a mid-market
accounting practice in the U.K.); Empson & Chapman, supra note 135 (case study of an alliance between two
large consulting firms, one organized as a partnership and one as a corporation); C.R. Hinings, et al., supra note
135 (examining the dynamics of management change in large accounting firms).
235. See Cooper et al., supra note 123 (case study of management change in two Canadian law firms);
Faulconbridge & Muzio, supra note 19 (qualitative study of management in 15 transnational law firms).
236. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Taking Law Firms Seriously, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 155, 172 (2002).
237. See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of
Lawyers in Context, in LAwYERs' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRAcTIcEs: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION 177, 198-202 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (arguing that the workplace is a central arena for
the formation of professional ideology and values).
238. See generally MARc GALANrER & THoMAs PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAwYERs: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE BIG LAW From (1991) (analyzing patterns of law firm growth between the 1950s and the 1980s); George P.
Baker & Rachel Parkin, The Changing Structure of the Legal Services Industry and the Careers of Lawyers,
84 N.C. L. REv. 1635 (2006) (examining changes in the legal services industry between 1998 and 2004).
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analysis and research. For instance, what is the strength offirm culture, relative to
that of professional networks and practice groups? By what mechanisms and to
what extent are the firm's expectations transmitted? What is the relationship
between firms' investment in ethical infrastructure-such as professional risk
managers-and firm members' expectations and understandings about how
things are done?
Such questions invite systematic qualitative and ethnographic analysis, which
in turn demands intimate access to firms. Law firms traditionally have been
loathe to provide such access. Firm counsel who participated in focus groups in
2001 and 2002 uniformly said they would not grant access to researchers to study
the effectiveness of risk management procedures in their firms. 23 9 As one
participant said, "I wouldn't let you do it... I'll be damned if I am going to let
those kinds of records outside." [2001-10].240
But times are changing. Firm leaders are increasingly aware of the importance
of effective risk management and the potentially high price of unethical conduct.
Many law firms have begun to undergo risk management audits by risk
management and loss prevention consultants. 24 1 And firm leaders are increas-
ingly interested in the organizational and psychological roots of misconduct
within firms. Legal ethics scholars and researchers should capitalize on this
interest and invest in systematic ethnographic research, with the aim of helping
well-intentioned firm leaders sustain ethical cultures within firms. Increasingly
"professional" law firm leaders can be expected to welcome such efforts.
239. Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 586.
240. Id.
241. See James W. Jones, High Stakes: The Growing Challenge of Law Firm Risk Management, N.Y.L.J,
Feb. 11, 2003, available at http://www.hildebrandt.com/Documents.aspx?Doc_ID= 1137 (discussing the bene-
fits of regular risk management audits).
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